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ON CONFUSING FEEI,ING WITH SENSATION, WITH
SPECIAL REFBRENCE TO THE PROBLEM OF
INTIMACY
Gabriel Marcel's philosophical work bristles with innovative
forays into the groundwork of metaphysics. In these, perhaps the "con-
crete approach", its abjuring of all systematization, its overriding concern
for the "string of reali~" offered by contact with the here and now, and
above all its commitment and situation, best characterizes this movement
of thought.1 It defies analysis and summation; it invites re-thinking. In
this vein, any critical comment should be seen as deepening the point of
contact Marcel himself provides, correcting the angle of approach, modi·
fying the pressure. The concept of error here is precluded. The latter
is a reflective notion, as Descartes demonstrates, that philosophical disco-
very must correspond to, or replicate, reality. It is very far from the
intimate and often shocking touch 'the real conveys.
Nonetheless, there is a serious confusion haunting the foun-
dations of Marcers work. It pervades his thought so globally that the
most abrief investigation can provide is a survey of its boundary lines,
and some very preliminary suggestions on how to redraw them. The
confusion I speak of is that between feeling and sensation, between the
"I feei" and the "I sense." Marcet terms his position "sensism" or a
"sensualistic" metaphysics.2 Yet, the expressiosn most pivotal to this
enterprise---fidelity, hope, admiration, love---are plainly affective. He
writes of incarnation---"the central 'given' of metaphysics"---as the
"situation of a being who appears to himself to be, as it were, bound to
a body"3 This fact issues in the prime requirement that
existence can only be sensed, as sensation is Ihe mode in which the
1 Creative FideJily, Ir. Robert RosthaI. (New York: Noonday Press, 1964), p. 64.
2 Metaphysical Journal, tr. Bemard Wall. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), p. 316.
JBeing and Having, tr. K. Farrer. (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p.1l.
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continuity of anything whatever with my body can be given to me as
datum.4
Then, in almost the same breath, he goes on to say that "to feel is not to
receive but to participate in an immediate way"s.
In giving examples of feelings, he frequently offers what is in fact
asensation, and vice-versa: as, e.g., when he speaks of being hungry as
a feeling6• After discussing the place of a "fundamental sensation" in the
metaphysical ground, he immediately moves to the claim that "this
Urgefuhl can in no way be fell, precisely because it is fundamental"'.
Instances of Marcel's lack of bearings on this matter could be multiplied.
It is important, however, (1) to pinpoint the basis of confusion; (2) to
examine the ontological disarray that it creates; and (3) to understand
how it threatens the movement central to Marcel's work, that of intima")'.
1. seDliDI and feeUq
The verb "to fee1" is deeply equivoca1. I can feel the lable, or
any of its qualities (hardness, smoothness, woodenness). My feeling the
table can be expressed propositionally: I feel that it is harde In each
case, a tactile contact with the table is presupposed, engendering a
sensate experience which is then conceptualized. Or, I can feel afraid, or
again, feel that 1 am afraid, for some reason or other. That is, I can be
subject to an emotional or affective experience, which is then expressed
on the conceptualleve1. Derivative from the last propositional usage is
themodality "I feel that", meant to express belief, as in, e.g., "I feet that
he is honest" or "I fee1 that it will rain."
The crucial linguistic difference between feeling sensately and
feeling affectively is the dimension of touch. Oddly enough, the
equivocity is taken up here too. The verb "to touch" can be synonymous
with tactile contact. Or, it can signify an engagement with an emotional
4Metaphysical Journal, p. 269.
s Ibid., p. 258.
6 Ibid., p. 247.
7 Ibid., p. 247.
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element, as, e.g., "His poverty touched me." This double ambiguity
affecting the idea of feeling cannot, moreover, be resolved by linguistic
fia t, since both kinds of usages have equal claim to priority. It is this two-
way oscillating structure, moving between sensibility and sensitivity,
between passions and sensations, that is responsible for the metaphysical
hedge that threatens to unseat Marcel's ontology. For, without saying as
much, Marcel warrants the transition from the sensate to the affective by
means of this unresolved ambiguity. Put another way, he transcribes his
discovery concerning the "central given"---my body---into an emotive
mode, stamping the results of the former with the insignia of the latter.
Behind the claim "to adopt a different attitude to sensation, or if you like,
to the act of feeling" is Marcel's set aversion to the problem of
disambiguating the matter of "feeling" itseIfJ.
Why? The nerve lies with Marcel's inexactitudes with the way
my body perceives, i.e., body-consciousness. For, the perceptual event of
"internai" or coenesthenique perception is unequivocally bound up with
sensation, not emotion. (Cf. "It can be seen straight away that my body
is only mine inasmuch as, however confusedly, it is felt"9). Marcel
indicates what sensation is not: it is not a message from "without", not
conceptualisable nor propositional, not objectifiable, not a sense-
datum10• However, he noticeably fails to say what sensation is, or more
precisely, how it arises within the workings of coenesthenia. Sensation
degenerates to a mystifying simple, somehowprovidingaccess to the real.
Yet the intimations are there. Through second reflection
("philosophical reflection"), which is "only a mode of attention," there is
access to body-consciousnessll. The attention, which hitherto had been
absorbed in the representational mode, confronting the demands of a
cartesian transparency, no longer is totaUy caught up in objective
imagery. It condenses. It, according to Marcel, is re-collected, or better,
re-gathers itself. This is an activity of developing substance, body,
a"Existenec and Objective," reprinted as an appendix to Metaphysical Journal, p. 327.
9Metaphysical Journal, p. 243.
lOCf. "Existence and Objectivity," pp. 327·330, for his argument against the "message
theory" of sensation.
llCreative FideJity, p. 23.
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pressure. Put simply, the attention, returning to my body, becomes touch.
Pried from its preoccupationwith, and disappearance in, analytic thought
the attention (to some degree or other) is able to turn to touch my body
from the inside.
It is here precisely that one of the ontological roots of the
semantic ambiguity of "touching" resides. For the touch of the body can
be one of two kinds. There is the touch of my hand on the table,
wherein my skin comes into contact with the table's surface. And, there
is the touch of the attention touching my hand, whether or not my hand
is in contact with anything else. The first is contractile touch; the second,
cotangible touch. Each, it could be said, evidences sensations. But only
contangible touch is perceived coenesthetically. Or, rather, it is itself that
mode of perceiving. Marcel falls to notice the distinction when he
asserts:
It is evident that whenever there is no direct contact there occurs a
construction of astate of consciousness that would correspond to the
contact, and that this state of consciousness generaUy condenses itself
into a sort of abstract symbol l1•
Not the body's contact, but the touch of attention, galvanizes
coenesthenique. Even ifwe call that which is evidence a sensing, to mark
it from contractile sensation, it is important to note that a sensing too is
a result, a percept, arecord of a perceptual event---and not the activity
of perceiving itself. That activity, coenesthesia or body-consciousness
proper, is the moving pressure of the attention, condensing (to a greater
or lesser degree) within the form of my body. A temporary equilibrium,
a high point of pressure, a more cotangible condensation--a sensing--may
be seized as evidence, incurring the risk therein of triggering repres-
entational strivings, and an attention rarefied to transparency. But ü not,
Ü coenesthenia is allowed to operate over an interval, only then do some
of the more signüicant possibilities of this mode of perception arise.
2. TowarcI an oDtology of seDlings
Contactile touch potentiates tactile sense-data. It is quickly
drawn into the chain of representational judgment. Here, Locke was not
that far wrong in identifying sensation with objectifying perception, for it
12MctaphysicaJ Journal, p. 24.
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is through sensations of contact that 1 arrive at judgments like "The table
is hard." Through long habit of retlection, sensation operates under the
demands of transparency. 118 value in seeking access to reality is nil. The
case is different with sensing. Sensing supposes a build-up of the
attention to the point that cotangible touch with the interior of my body
is attained. Directing, developing, and maintaining the attentive pressure
of touch inside has unmistakably ontological consequences. To these
Marcel alludes when he says:
what we call ''the jump to ccistence" is really a kind of intraexistential
transformation. That is the only way to avoid idealism13•
What transformation? Sustained engagement with contangible
touch stabilizes and deepens the experience of sensing. In itself, however,
touch is merely generalized over the interior surface of my body. It is in
relation to that which resists the pressure--the touched--that a new
element arises. Initially, pressure or force against a countering surface,
requires a container in order to manifest itself. Then, under continued
touch, the touched, when resisted with solidity, becomes permeable. This
is what Marcel suggests when he notices:
that permeability... is doubtless related to a certain lack of cohesion,
or if one prefe rs, of density. We can say, it seems, that a being is
more exposed to influences insofar as he has less densityl".
The attentive pressure than can enter what hitherto blocked i18 touch.
The line demarking one from the other is, in that moment, transposed to
some new boundary. Surface is no longer surface, but interior. Touch
and touched conjoin, amplifying the force of attentive pressure.
The blending of the two, the touch and the touched, brings about
more than an extended condensation of the attention. The shift to a
highly permeable, less dense, bodily milieu generates a two-fold change
in the conditions of sensing. First, that which stood in my way, a thing,
that for which 1 had assigned instrumentalities, no longer remains
exterior, separate, in opposition:
13Being and Having, p. 27.
uCreative FideJity, p. 23.
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The metaphysical essence of the object as such is perhaps simply its
power of sealing-offls.
Instead, there are what Marcel calls "prolongation" of my body, a set of
internal relations, hence, sensings, which in composite take the place of
the objecl. This is a point 1 will return to in the following section.
Second, the stabilized pressure of the attention calls a quality to the
sensing which informs it with the mark of an identity, one which is mine.
As Marcel says:
A presence is a reality; it is a kind of influx; it depends upn us to be
permeable to this influx, but not, to tell the truth, to call it forth1'.
Opening to the depths of an expanding pressure oflhe attention, 1 notice
emerging from the composite sensings a sense of the one that 1 am,
myself. The transformation of touch is immanently personal. It provides
the genesis of my identity. It is recollective in the most primordial way:
in front of the disparate sensing of my bodily interior, that lappears once
again as the forgotten source of which each sensing is a tributary.
Through sensing, 1 contact anew the reality that is mine.
Thus, Marcel's "jump to existence" is in fact a path each step of
which is to be trod. Condensing the attention within my body, allowing
sensing to delimit the boundaries of cotangible touch, permitting the
transaction between the resistance and the attentive pressure to occur,
letting enter that which ronfers quality to the sensing, participating in the
I which emerges from the depths of the tangibly sensed. Each step brings
me closer to touch with reality. Or, each step makes the touch 1 exert
more real, more real because it is mine (and not some representational
figment of who 1 am), and because it is more in keeping with the way
things are (and not the way 1 presume them representationally to be).
Each step, moreover, is a fleshing out of the initial sensing. It is not that
sensing is every "transcended" at some step of the path. Rather, sensing
increasingly ftlls out, and is filled out by, the body that is mine. In
becoming more active, less dense, more permeable, sensing opens the
pores of the organism from the inside until it is ready to welcome the
lJBeing and Having, p. 113.
16The PhiJosophyofExistencc, tr. M. Harari, (Freeport: Books for übrary Press, 1949),
p.24.
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reality in which it is immersed. The aim of the concrete approach,
through this transition, can be summed up by the question, how to remain
in touch with sensing?
We are involved in Being, and it is not in our power to leave it; more
simply, we are, and our whole inquiry is just how to place ourselves in
relation to plenary Reality17.
3. WSympathetic mediation-
Some of the most suggestive of Marcel's thought centers around
the existence of things, other bodies, when my body is recognized as the
"central given." What happens to objects under the transforming pressure
of touch? Here is opportunity for a decisive formulation of the place of
the physical universe in his thought. Yet, because of the ambiguous
tension within the notion of feeling remains unresolved, the moment is
not seized.
How are things to be accounted for in the non-representational
medium of contangible touch? Marcel says that:
between me and all that exists there is a relation... of the same type
as the relation that unites me to my body; instrumental or objective
mediation is completed by what I have called a non-instrumental med-
iation. This amounts to saying that my body is in sympathy with
things18•
Granted that under the demands of transparency, my objectifying habits
of reflection grasp a thing conceptually, in terms of the uses to which it
can be put. And the "non-instrumental mediation"? That role plainly is
assigned to feeling, "feeling" as affectivity. "Sympathy" is pre-eminently
an emotive term. Feeling sympathy for another means being affected
similarly by what affects him. This emotional accord or mutuality of
interest also comes into play when I am in sympathy with another. There
is no such thing as an unfelt sympathy. Thus, the notion of a sympathetic
mediation recalls Marcel's "forefeeling" used to describe second retlecting;
it suggests the calling into play of a sense I might enjoy of a feIt harmony
with things. The affectivity's response to its thing-laden environment then
'''Being and Having, p. 35.
l8Metaphys!cal Journal, p. 274.
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is a feIt community19.
Giving primacy to affectivities here may be tempting to Marcel
because of the apparently higher cognitive value they have than
sensations. Yet this conflict with the immediacy he attributes to them
when cleaved of the representation we customarily associate with each20•
Indeed, it is the non-representational character, which they share with
sensation, which reinforces the ontological confusion. But unless Marcel
subscribes to William James' theory of the emotions, making them the
causal consequence of bodily states, there is no reason to believe the
different immediacies--sensate and sentiment--always march hand in hand.
What is lacking in its entirety is a separate analysis of he body-
consciousness of the emotions. Without this, what is most evident is how
affectivity leads away from the body that is mine, e.g., how strong
emotions like fear lead the soldier to disregard fatigue and hunger,or
how weaker ones like nostalgia evoke memory. Thus, sympathy is an
unsatisfactory basis for revealing my body's touch on physical objects.
Now, what "unites me to my body" is the attentive pressure of
cotangible touch. Could not sensing likewise place me in direct contact
with physical reality? In this case, a kind of synaesthetic mediation would
be called into play. Another body in the environment is encountered as
something resisting my touch. Then, when the attention presses the
inside surface of my body, sensing, the inward pressure generated by the
object becomes part of the general resisting force. Where there is a
persistent display of attention, the activity becomes transformatory. The
attention condenses and expands; the body surface becomes permeable.
That which resists, the untouched knot, grows penetrable. No longer
separate from my touch, it becomes part of it. Or, more precisely, to use
Marcers term, it prolongs it. Perception of another body becomes
not representation but a prolongation of the act by which I apprehend
my body as mine21•
19Cf. the discussion of the sentiment of community. MClaph)'sial Journa~ p. 282.
20 Ibid., p. 307.
21 Ibid., p.274.
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Furthermore,
Things exist for me in the measure in which I look upon them as
prolongation of my body22.
To prolong, in this sense, is to transmute Cartesian extension into the
medium of sensing. It is to extend my body through newly discovered
internat" relations with things, the sensing of them, when the attentive
pressure is sustained at sufficient depth. It is to intensify the sensing by
incorporating the force of resistance. It is to exercise coenesthesia to the
point of generating the quality of perception which is the harbinger of the
identity that is mine.
Finally, this formulation shows how far from the mark it is to
label Marcel a Berkelian idealist. For Berkeley, the cessation of
perception brought with it the cessation of the physical universe. For
Marrel, on the contrary, that universe plays a crucial role in developing
the transformatory force. Paraphrasing aremark of his we could say that
the radical abolition of other bodies, supposing it were possible, would
mean the destruction of my body insofar as it is mine23•
4. FeeUq ud iDtIDIaq
Thus we are indirectly brought to the question whether there is not a
basis for granting the existence of a fundamental analogy between the
sensory perceptivity of a Uving being exposed to the solicitations of his
surroundings and the disposability of a consciousness capable ofcaring
ror another person14
The continuing semantic tension inherent in "feeling" blunts Marcel's
approach to the problem of the intimate other. He continues to look in
both directions, toward a "feit community" with the other2S and toward
the approach through sensing. 1 have already suggested that the
emotivism or intuitionism implied by the first is inadequate to his aims.
llIbid., p. 211.
23Cf. Ibid., p. 243.
24 Creative FideJity, p.88.
25For example, MetaphysicaJ Journal, p. 291.
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It neglects any treatment of how emotions relate to feelings. But the
second would not only disambiguate his key term. It would also, by
ßeshing out this "fundamental analogy," make clear the identity of the
other, with whom I enjoy a relation of intimacy.
How is a concrete approach to intimacy ("one of the most imp-
ortant"26) to be made? Under sustained pressure of the attention, coen-
esthesia becomes stabilized. Whereas initiaDy, touch was "blindfold," it
now gains some perceptibility as it remains in front of what is touched.
Density begins to be transformed to permeability. The remaining frag-
ments of representational transparency are replaced by sensing. The
balance of reßection shifts from thought to organism. At this point, at
the depth of attentive activity, the conditions are suitable for the entry of
a qualitative dimension. Sensing on this global scale seems to attract a
kind of emotion to it. It ceases to remain a composite, instead becoming
an identity. This identity calls itself to an immediate, undeniable recog-
nition. It is the identity that is mine. Its recognition releases what
Marcel call "an exclamatory awareness of seif."
Fxistence and the ccc1amatory awareness of ccistence cannot reaHy be
separated; the dissociation of the two can be carried out only at the
cost of robbing the subject of our investigation of its proper nature;
separated from that exclamatory awareness. .. existence tends to be
reduced to its own corpse... 27
Emerging from the depths of non-representational touch, this recognition
lacks aD adequate means of expression. Because there are no criteria of
success in describing it propositionally, choice of conveyance is arbitrary.
This is not, however, to claim that the recognition cannot be commun-
icated, but certainly more indicated than said. It can be pointed to, but
again, the ostensive definition lacks success criteria. Thus, there is license
in Marcers personal choice of traditionally emotive terms for this exclam-
atory recognition., viz., hope, fidelity, love. The matter of license would
far less dangerous freed from the background equivocity over "feeling."
Calling the emergent cognition "emotion" must, in any event be left open
to question. If emotion furnishes the spring of action, this "emotion"
u Ibid., p. 200.
27 Le myst~rede r~tre, vol.l. (Paris: Arbier, 1951), pp. 103-107; translated by John B.
O'Malley in The Fellowship of Being (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966), p. 66.
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nccd not move me to do anything whatsoever. Indeed, by the abundance
of its qualitative dimension, it robs desire of the incompleteness that
customarily motivates. On the other hand, the thorough-going perme-
ability which is the recipient to this exclamatory recognition is more
patient than agent. If there is action, I am not as ready to claim it as
belonging to me. Rather, the recognition readies me for a kind of
stewardship, as Marrel describes it:
that I must keep myself at the disposal of the unknown Me, so that
one day he can come into my place without meeting any resistance
from the Me that I am still, but should have in that second ceased to
be 28.
This stewardship is presaged by the foretaste that awakens a responsibility
to the new role it demands of me--participation. The weight of this
participation is too exhaustive to examine here. For, the demands of
participation carry with them the implication that the ultimate power, of
sensing, of transforming my bodily milieu, of moving toward the real, does
not lie within my own disposal. Marcel says
this disposal or power always implies the interposal of the organisID,
i.e., of something about which, for that very reason, I cannot say it is
of my disposal29•
Attending to the sensing pressure in my body, I awaken to the recognition
that I have not brought about what occurs, that tbe very notion of my
own agency has come into question. Uncannily, in tbis discovery, the
primal encounter with the intimate other--the tbou--appears. Who is the
other, and how do I achieve contact? Marcel answers from the
perspectives of bis emotivism, noting,
simply that inasmuch as I am a tabulation (repertoire) that I treat
myself as such, I am only a third person for myself. It is only through
emotion that I become a thou for myself30.
This is inaccuratee The ontological shitt corresponding to the
2.8 Being and Having, p. 52.
29Ibid., p. 82
30 Metaphysical Journal, p. 200.
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grammatical transformation from third to second person familiar is not
driven by affectivity, but sensitivity. Emotion, if called that, enters only
superveniently, as a later sign of an intimacy already in tull force. It is
not a generative element. In returning the attentive pressure to the
inside of my body, sensing begins. In this movement, the attention is
disengaged from the habitual representational modes that characterize
functional life. Part of habit is to formula te an abstract identity for
myself, a personality, an ego.
I can attribute to myself aseries of predicates as though somebody
else were attribute them to Me; in this measure I am 's<>mebody else"
for myself; I speak of myself as I would speak of anybody else31•
When the back of this idealist representation is broken by the advent of
sensing, contangible contact with the resisting surface is attained. This is
the scene for the ontologizing transformation of constriction ioto
permeability. This the matrix from which the one I do not and cannot
know arises--the one that I am. This event, Marcel is quite sure about,
is nothing other than the encounter with the thou.
But what about other persons? 00 I not contact another as a
thou? It would be mistaken to construct a simple equation between
another person and the thou. Or rather, such an equation would once
more signal belief in a "fell community", of which land the other are
members. And it is true that in certain moods, Marcel speaks of other
persons in this way32. But in fact, it is through touch, through sensing,
that I encounter the condition of intimacy 'that allows me to say "thou."
Marcel acknowledges this when he says one
is not to be construed here as externally manifesting oneself to the
other, but rather as involving a quality which cannot be so easily
described in objective terms, of making me sense that he is with
me.33
In this fashion, other persons become prolongations of my body in the
31 Ibid., p. 220.
32Cf. MetaphysicaJ Journal, p. 286: ''Actually I cannot help trealing the 'fact of being
thou' as the predicate of a hirn."
33 Creative FideJity, p.154.
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same way things do. By their physical resistance, they aUow for the
deepening pressure of the attention, which alone can open to receive the
exclamatory recognition of my own identity. All sharing, all contact in
intimacy, must take place through this vehicle. There is no other.
The other is the resistant surface thrown up in the face of the
real, behind which I manoeuver. Cotangible touch with it reveals its
otherness. It opens the way for intimacy. This is perhaps why it is
possible to experience reality with a tree, an animal, or any sentiment
being. Still, with regard to other persons, there seems to be something
exceptionaI. What is it? It is not, 1 believe, as Marcel claims, that "the
us without doubt reveals itself as much more profound than the 1."34
This once again derives from his belief in a "feIt community" of persons.
Nor is it quite accurate to say the exclamatory recognition "behaves as the
affirmation of a you also."35 For this sounds like my coming to an
identity which is mine, in the depths of sensing, has something to do with
recognizing another as a person--which it does not. The inclusiveness of
this identity is real. As said, the boundaries habitually separating me
from the world are rendered permeable in the later phases of sensing.
But then, the other person is admitted together with the rest of reality,
not as a special element. The other person is simply one face of the
many-faceted real.
The exceptional characteristic of another person rather has to do
with resistance and with that other's own involvement with touch. First,
another person resists my movements in ways that things cannot. He
thwarts my plans, he challenges my motives, he contradicts my actions.
The greater the resisting surface he provides, the greater the opportunity
for coming to the transformation of sensing, provided the initial move is
made. Second, the other person might also be seeking a way to contact
the real. He also might be engaging the attentive pressure, which can
lead to sensing. Ir so, then it is possible to repeat with Marcel: "This is
what 1 have translated by the word co-participation; or could just as weIl
34pr6sence el immortalile (Paris: Flammarion, 1959), p. 160; tr. by O'Malley, op. cit.,
p.78.
3Slbid., p. 162.
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speak of co-implication." 36 In this case, his exploration can resonate in
my body, bringing me closer to my own. In this case, both he and I
would conjointly be working for intimacy. Yet, there is no guarantee of
this situation; and the impact of the other's resisting aspect on my body
is surely the more customary form of meeting.
5. CondulJon
I have tried to show how some of Marcel's basic work flounders
on an ambiguity in the notion of feeling. Because of his attraction to an
emotivism, he withholds hirnself from a closer examination of the body's
own form of perception, coenesthenia. Body consciousness, that is,
sensing as opposed to affectively feeling, alone holds the key to contacting
the real. I have sketched the way in which sensing provides an account
of the physical universe. At the same time, I have outlined the place of
intimacy, and where the other enters my bodily habitat. Finally, it must
be said, in sum, that the matrix of this thought can be located in Marcel,
but like a pearl from an oyster, it must be prried lose.
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